2.7. Anger, Enmity, and Hatred
And we feel friendly to those who desire the same things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share them together; otherwise the same trouble arises here too. And towards those with whom we are on such terms that, while we respect their opinions, we need not blush before them for doing what is conventionally wrong. As well, towards those before whom we should be ashamed to do anything really wrong.
Again, our rivals, and those whom we should like to envy us—though without ill-feeling—either we like these people or at least we wish them to like us. And we feel friendly towards those whom we help to secure good for themselves, provided we are not likely to suffer heavily by it ourselves. And those who feel as friendly to us when we are not with them as when we are—which is why all men feel friendly towards those who are faithful to their dead friends. And, speaking generally, towards those who are really fond of their friends and do not desert them in trouble; of all good men, we feel most friendly to those who show their goodness as friends.
Also towards those who are honest with us, including those who will tell us of their own weak points. And it has just been said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is conventionally wrong, and if we do have this feeling, we do not love them. If therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them. We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or uncomfortable—nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened.
Friendship has various forms: comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on. Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses, doing them unasked, and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.
Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference to their opposites. Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or calumny. Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even without that; we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their character.
Anger is always concerned with individuals—a Callias or a Socrates—whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer. Moreover, anger can be cured by time, but hatred cannot. The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm; the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether they feel or not. All painful things are felt, but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least felt, since their presence causes no pain. And anger is accompanied by pain, while hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not. Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated. For the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist.
It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so. If they claim to be so, we can refute their claim. If it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer.
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